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ABSTRACT 
Agency theory, leading edge, and administrativetlife cycle perspectives all predict 
that organizations having high levels of Research and Development (R&D) intensity will 
follow different compensation strategies than organizations that are less R&D intensive. 
Using data from 110 organizations over a 5 year period, and controlling for organization 
differences in employee and job characteristics, we found support for this general 
prediction. Specifically, high R&D intensity organizations tended to have higher relative 
base pay, higher relative bonus pay, and greater relative eligibility for long-term incentive 
payments. We discuss the importance of further research into compensation decisions in 
R&D intensive firms, particularly the effects of such decisions on firms' competitiveness. 
THE EFFECTS OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INTENSITY 
ON MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION IN LARGE ORGANIZATIONS' 
A growing literature suggests that differences exist between the compensation of 
employees in research and development (R&D) intensive (often called "high tech") firms 
compared to employees in other firms (Kanter, 1989; Schuster, 1987; Kleingartner & 
Anderson, 1987; Balkin & Gomez-Mejia, 1984, 1987). Consultant surveys report similar 
patterns of differences (Wyatt, 1989; Bradford Associates, 1988; Hay Group, 1986). In the 
major empirical work on the matter, Balkin and Gomez-Mejia's (1984, 1987) found, for 
example, that compensation managers in R&D intensive firms reported greater use of 
performance-contingent pay in the form of stock awards and bonuses for scientists and 
engineers than did their counterparts in other firms. 
As Balkin and Gomez-Mejia (1984, 1987) recognized, their research served as a 
useful beginning point, but had some potential limitations. First, compensation was 
measured using self-reports from a single source in each firm (the person responsible for 
compensation management). The accuracy of these self-reports is open to question, 
especially in cases where the respondent is asked to provide an estimate of the firm's 
competitive position (e.g., on base pay) compared to other firms.' Moreover, it is the 
actual compensation received by employees, rather than the perceptions of compensation 
administrators, that is most likely to have an impact on employee attitudes, behaviors, and 
organization effectiveness. Second, their research focused exclusively on scientists and 
engineers (and only those in R&D units). It would be useful to know whether the 
practices applied to this key group of employees (in R&D intensive firms) also sets the 
tone for compensation practices applied to other employees. Pressures for internal 
consistency or a corporate culture dominated by R&D personnel might contribute to this 
type of spillover. Third, the Balkin and Gomez-Mejia research used only firms within a 
70 mile radius of the Boston "Route 128 technology center." It is unclear to what extent 
practices in such firms represent local versus national practices. A final problem with the 
Balkin and Gomez-Mejia (and consultant survey) findings is the lack of control of other 
factors that are likely to influence organization differences in compensation practices such 
as job (e.g., level) and individual (e.g., education, experience) characteristics. 
Our study makes two contributions to the literature on compensation decisions and 
R&D intensive firms. First, it uses a national sample to provide new evidence on 
differences between large R&D intensive and other firms in actual compensation outcomes 
for top- and mid- level managers. Our focus is on potential differences in base salaries, 
short-term bonus payments and long-term incentive eligibility practices. Second, aside from 
Balkin and Gomez-Mejia's work, much of literature tends to be descriptive, anecdotal, or 
speculative, offering only limited theoretical explanations for observed patterns of 
compensation differences. In contrast, we consider agency theory, leading edge, and 
administrativeflife cycle explanations for why firms that emphasize R&D would be 
expected to compensate managers differently. 
R&D INTENSITY, HIGH TECH AND INNOVATION 
How do we recognize a high tech or R&D intensive organization when we see it? 
Writers on this topic often use concepts such as high tech, R&D intensive, and innovative 
interchangeably when describing organizations. Briefly stated, high technology 
organizations have been defined as those that exhibit some combination of the following 
characteristics. They emphasize inventions and innovation in their business strategies, 
deploy a significant percentage of their financial resources to R&D, employ a relatively 
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high percentage of scientists and engineers in the work force, or compete in worldwide, 
short-life cycle markets (BLS, 1982; Kleingartner & Anderson, 1987; Balkin & Gomez- 
Mejia, 1987). The BLS definition of high tech industries includes electronic components, 
communications equipment, guided missile and space, aircraft, drugs, biotechnology, and 
information technology firms (BLS, 1982). Consultants seem to define high tech according 
to their clients' needs. Thus, Wyatt's ECS High Tech Industry Group (1989) includes 
aerospace, electronics, semi conductors, telecommunications instruments, biomedical 
equipment, computers, and office equipment firms. 
R&D intensity generally refers to the extent to which resources, financial and 
human, are devoted to R&D (Gambino and Gartenberg, 1979). Bound, Cummins, 
Griliches, Hall, and Jaffe (1985) note that the R&D expenditures must be reported on the 
10-K form when they are "material" or "exceeded one percent of sales." Research 
typically treats R&D intensity as a continuous variable measured as: (1) the ratio of R&D 
expenditures to sales,,(2) R&D expenditures per employee, (3) the level of R&D 
expenditures, (4) the number of patents applied for or, granted and so on (Griliches, 1986). 
Innovation, according to Acs and Audretsch (1988), is a process that begins with an 
invention, proceeds with the development of that invention, and results in the introduction 
of a new or modified product, process, or service in the market. They see R&D 
expenditures as an input into the innovative process. 
However, nuances and complexities quickly become apparent in using these 
definitions. For example, Galbraith (1982) distinguishes between invention (creating new 
ideas) and innovation (transforming the idea into a process or product). He prescribes 
different organizational systems for innovative and operational (manufacturing) 
organizations. Current wisdom in the business press is that firms achieve competitive 
advantage by shortening the time from invention to market through the use of product 
teams comprised of R&D, marketing, and manufacturing personnel (Business Week 
Innovation, 1989). In a related development, Scarpello, Boulton, and Hofer (1986) see 
three roles for R&D as part of a business strategy: (I)  developing new products ahead of 
competitors, (2) improving product quality, or (3) improving manufacturing processes. 
Further complexities arise when we consider almost any large corporation. Some 
business units within the firm may be more R&D intensive, high tech, and/or innovative 
than others. GE, for example, includes NBC, financial services (Kidder Peabody), and 
space and defense divisions (GE Aerospace). Does it make sense to classify GE as high 
tech, R&D intensive, or innovative? Does it fall into one, two, or all three of these 
categories? 
In the present paper, we have chosen to focus on R&D intensity, a concept that has 
received a good deal of focus in the literature (e.g., Balkin & Gomez-Mejia, 1984, 1987). 
Because there is no consensus in the literature on one best way to measure R&D intensity, 
we examine three measures: total R&D expenditures, R&D expenditures/employees, and 
R&D expenditure~/sales.~ 
R&D7s EFFECTS ON MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION 
Why would we expect to find differences in the compensation of managers in R&D 
intensive firms compared to their counterparts in other firms? We consider three potential 
explanations for a link between compensation practices and R&D intensity: the leading 
edge premise, administrative/life-cycle prescriptions, and agency theory. 
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The leading edge premise is that innovations in personnel policies match the 
technological innovations that characterize these firms. If R&D (and high tech) is the next 
frontier of the industrial revolution and the basis on which future competitive advantage is 
to be achieved, then the personnel and compensation practices of these firms are also likely 
to be leading edge in nature (Balkin & Gomez-Mejia, 1984). This argument that certain 
organizations, in this case R&D firms, lead and others follow their behaviors is consistent 
with notions of patterns or wage contours described by Dunlop (1957) and the institutional 
theory ideas emerging in organization theory (Scott, 1986). In the domain of 
compensation, it would suggest that certain compensation approaches, such as performance 
contingent pay, would be more likely to occur in R&D units because innovation is endemic 
to these organizations and such pay practices are considered innovative. 
Prescriptions in the administrative and strategic literature explain the R&D intensity 
effect on managerial compensation in terms of product or organization life cycles, and cash 
flow demands. Cook (1976) was one of the earliest to argue that firms in startup and 
growth stages of their product life cycles face strong cash demands to finance capital 
expansion. They also have an external resource focus, based on the need to attract key 
technical contributors. Thus, Cook (1976), followed by Ellig (1981) and others, advised 
startup and growth firms to emphasize stock options and variable short-term pay increases 
in lieu of higher base pay as a means of conserving cash for investment and growth. 
Consistent with these ideas, recent strategic perspectives toward compensation (Milkovich, 
1988; Gomez-Mejia & Welborne, 1988), building on contingency models, hypothesize that 
the greater the congruency between an organization's external environment, culture, internal 
conditions, and its compensation decisions, the more effective it will be. 
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The Balkin and Gomez-Mejia (1984, 1987) research described earlier has provided 
the most complete empirical test of the administrativellife cycle predictions. In the 1984 
study, findings were somewhat mixed. Although, the reported use of contingent or variable 
pay was indeed greater in R&D intensive firms than in other firms, so too were reported 
base salary levels. Similarly, although growth stage firms reported greater use of variable 
pay, they also reported higher base pay levels as well. 
In the 1987 study, however, Balkin and Gomez-Mejia re-examined these issues (and 
some new ones) using compensation variables that were re-defined in terms of their relative 
importance in the pay mix. (Each component was reported as a percentage of total 
compensation.) With these re-defined compensation dependent variables, they found strong 
support for most of the key hypotheses. For example, variable pay was found to represent 
a greater proportion of compensation in both R&D intensive and growth stage firms. They 
also found that both benefits and base salary accounted for smaller proportions of total 
compensation in these types of firms, consistent with the idea that one of their important 
goals is to minimize fixed costs. In addition, they found the positive relation between 
R&D intensity and variable pay to be strongest in small firms and growth stage 
firms. 
Despite this apparent support for the life cycle perspective, it is important to 
recognize that the external validity of these findings remains open to question. Aside from 
the potential limitations mentioned earlier, note that the majority of Balkin and Gomez- 
Mejia's sample was composed of firms with fewer than 500 employees. Only 9 firms had 
over 5000 employees. One criticism of the product life cycle approach is that it's logic 
seems to break down when applied to larger, multi-product firms (Milkovich, 1988; Kerr, 
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1987). For example, large R&D intensive firms such as Merck and Digital Equipment are 
not cash poor. Thus, we would not necessarily expect as much concern with reducing 
fixed costs and preserving scarce cash resources for investment. Moreover, larger firms 
typically have multiple product lines, some of which may be in the growth stage, some of 
which may be in the mature stage, meaning that classifications in terms of product life 
cycle may be of questionnable validity. 
Agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1988, 1989; Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) 
offers another theoretical explanation for the R&D effect. Essentially, it is based on the 
assumption that the separation of ownership (principals) from control (agents or managers) 
in publicly held corporations results in an asymmetry of information between owners and 
managers. Managers in large R&D firms hold information about their technical abilities 
and behaviors that is not available to the owners or requires significant costs for owners to 
monitor. The theory assumes that managers and owners act in their own best interests. 
Thus, for example, outcome based compensation (e.g., performance contingent bonus and 
stock plans) is offered to increase the likelihood that managers will act in the best interest 
of the owners. Under such plans, payouts to managers depend on objective outcomes such 
as ROE, ROA, or changes in shareholder wealth. 
The agency theory explanation of the R&D effect is based on the premise that R&D 
intensive firms are subject to an exacerbation of the owner-manager information asymmetry. 
R&D managers have greater access to significant technical, new product, or service 
information which can be implemented in their current firm or another one--such as a new 
venture started by the few key managers who leave. Compared to less R&D intensive 
firms, behavioral monitoring and collection of such technical data in the R&D firm would 
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be more costly (if not impossible) than measuring outcomes. Thus, the logic goes, 
managers' behavior and information cannot be as readily observed or controlled in R&D 
firms due to the very nature of the innovative process. R&D inputs at one time period 
may not show readily observable results for several periods (Ruch, 1980; Beardsley, 1974). 
Furthermore, some interim performance measures in use are misguided (Brown and 
Swenson, 1988). Such indexes as patents applied for, publications, and meeting deadlines 
suffer because engineers are unlikely to publish (Allen, 1977), firms are less and less likely 
to patent in preference to holding the information proprietary (Bound et al., 1985), and 
meeting time deadlines is open to interpretation (Ruch, 1980). 
Thus, according to agency theory, large R&D intensive firms are more likely than 
others to (1) position their base pay above competitors to first attract the necessary talent 
and to retain their technical ideas and potential innovations, (2) make use of higher ratios 
of bonus to base pay to focus managers' decisions on outcomes rather than bear the costs 
of monitoring managers' interim behaviors, and (3) have greater eligibility of managers for 
long-term incentives which provide managers with incentives to remain and implement their 
ideas.4 
It should be kept in mind that R&D intensity is only one of several factors that 
may influence compensation decisions (see Gerhart & Milkovich, 1989, for a review). 
Dyer and Holder's (1989) strategic perspective suggests that three prototypical human 
resource strategies can be conceived: (1) inducers, in which compensation is used to 
induce desired behaviors (high base pay, emphasis on incentives), (2) investors, in which 
compensation plays a subordinate role to employment security, training, and employee 
assistance programs (meet competitors' base pay, greater emphasis on merit rather than 
bonus and long-term incentives), and (3) involvers, in which firms emphasize participation, 
teams, and sharing gains (emphasis on performance based bonuses). Note that greater 
emphasis on performance contingent pay is prescribed under both inducer and involver 
strategies. Dyer and Holder propose that although certain fits between strategy and 
conditions may be more appropriate, any of the three strategic types may be observed 
under similar environmental and organization conditions. Consequently, enough 
management discretion may exist, even within R&D intensive firms, to choose from a 
variety of human resource and compensation strategies. 
In summary, the leading edge, administrativepife-cycle, and agency theory 
perspectives all predict that the pattern of managerial compensation in R&D intensive firms 
will exhibit greater bonus to base ratios and greater eligibility among managers for long- 
term incentives. Further, agency theory predicts that R&D firms' base compensation will 
lead competitors, whereas the alternative models predict a policy of meeting competitors' 
base pay practices. 
METHOD 
Sample 
The Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies (CAHRS) Managerial 
Compensation Data Base was used for this study. It includes data on over 200 firms for 
the period 1981-85. The data include compensation, employee, job, and organization 
characteristics provided by a large private consulting firm; corporate level financial data 
derived from COMPUSTAT; and corporate R&D data from the NBERYs R&D master file 
for the period 1981-85 (Hall, Cummins, Laderman, & Mundy, 1988). The number of firms 
for this study was reduced to 110, to include only those for which compensation, financial, 
11 
and R&D data were present, and which had three or more firms in the same industry, 
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broadly defined using the 2-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. Data on at 
least 75 employees per firm were analyzed. Compensation and financial data were adjusted 
to 1980 dollars using the CPI. Jobs in the data base covered a broad range of managerial 
and R&D positions, including top R&D engineering managers, top applied and basic 
researchers, top developmental engineers, and project managers. 
Measures and Analysis 
The compensation, financial, and R&D data were measured at the firm level. 
Dependent Variables. Each of the three compensation variables described below 
was measured as an organization average, statistically adjusted for organization differences 
in human capital (including years of education, potential experience (age - years of 
experience - 6), firm tenure, job tenure, and squared terms for the tenure/experience 
measures). The compensation variables were also statistically adjusted for organization 
differences in two job characteristics, the number of reporting levels from the board of 
directors, and the number of management levels supervised. The purpose of these 
statistical adjustments was to eliminate differences in compensation between organizations 
stemming from differences in employee characteristics or levels of responsibility. 
Base salary is the firm's mean base salary for its managerial employees (exclusive 
of short- and long-term bonuses) relative to the sample as of March 1 of the survey year. 
This variable is operationalized as a percent above or below the sample mean. Bonus as a 
percent of base is the firm's bonus to base ratio relative to the sample, operationalized in 
terms of percentage points above or below the sample mean. Long-term incentive 
eligibility is the firm's proportion of managers eligible for long-term incentives relative to 
the sample, operationalized as percentage points above or below the sample mean. 
Independent Variables. Organization characteristics included the number of 
employees (Compustat #29); net sales (Compustat Item #12); income before extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations (Compustat Item #16); and industrv (the 2-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code for the firm). 
As noted earlier, R&D intensity can be measured in several ways. We selected 
three measures frequently used in the literature. First, we used total R&D Expenditures 
(Compustat item #46). However, this measure is heavily influenced by firm size. Clearly, 
R&D intensive firms are often defined in terms of their relative expenditures on R&D. 
Therefore, we also measured R&D intensity relative to size by using both R&D 
Expenditures/employees, and R&D Expenditures/sales. 
Although these measures control for firm size, they raise other issues. For example, 
R&D/Sales, perhaps the most commonly used measure, suffers from sales variability within 
the innovation process. Firms with projects at the beginning of the innovation process 
(e.g., superconductivity, or AIDS drug research) would experience lower sales, and 
consequently higher R&D/Sales than those with projects in midstream or entering the end 
of the process (e.g., semiconductors), which generate more revenues, even if both spent the 
same amount on R&D relative to its potential value added. Scherer (1984) suggests using 
R&D per employee to avoid this problem, and others suggest including the sheer 
magnitude of R&D expenditures. 
The three R&D intensity measures were treated as continuous variables in our 
analysis. We also subgrouped firms on each measure into High R&D, and Other 
categories. The conventional 5% and above was used for the R&D/Sales measure (BLS, 
1983; Business Week, 1989). Using the 5% threshold resulted in 23 of the 110 firms 
being classified as R&D Intensive. The top 23 firms on each of the other two measures 
were then also classified into the high R&D Intensity category for comparison purposes. 
In 1980 dollars, the threshold for high R&D Intensity based on R&D/employee was $4,000. 
Using the R&D/sales measure, the cutoff was $130 million. 
As Exhibit 1 shows, only 10 of the 23 firms classified as high R&D Intensity based 
on R&D/Sales were also classified as high R&D Intensive using the other two measures. 
These comparisons demonstrate that the various R&D Intensity measures are not necessarily 
substitutes for one another, and therefore, it is useful to study multiple measures of R&D 
Intensity. 
Exhibit 2 contains a summary of the data (scaled in 1980 dollars) used in our 
analyses. 
As noted previously, our approach was to first adjust each firm's compensation 
outcomes for human capital and job characteristics differences yielding an average residual 
(over individuals) for each organization for each year. These adjusted averages were taken 
as indicative of the organization's relative position regarding base, bonusbase, and long- 
term incentive eligibility in each year, controlling for employee and job differences (see 
Gerhart & Milkovich, 1989 for more information on this method). The next step was to 
examine and compare the pattern of compensation decisions in High R&D Intensive versus 
other firms. Finally, we performed a series of multiple regressions for each of the three 
compensation outcomes to assess the unique contribution of R&D Intensity. 
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RESULTS 
Over the 1981 to 1985 period, each measure of R&D Intensity displayed 
considerable stability (r = 35,  R&D/Sales; r = .86, R&D/Employees; r = .81, total R&D 
expenditures). Similarly, two of the compensation variables, base salary (r = .89) and 
long-term incentive eligibility (r = .67), also displayed stability. This evidence of stability 
is important because it suggests that both R&D intensity and compensation practices are 
enduring characteristics of firms. 
A partial exception to the general pattern of stability was found for the bonusbase 
pay ratio (r = .40). This finding is not surprising, however, because the actual bonus 
payment in any given year may depend on a combination of individual, unit, and firm 
performance measures, all of which fluctuate from year to year. As one example, the 
correlation between return on assets measured in 1981 and 1985 was only .08. Given this 
instability in firm (and probably other measures of) performance, a much more troubling 
finding would be high stability in bonus payments because bonus payments that do not 
change with changes in performance represent, in effect, entitlements and fixed costs, just 
like base pay. 
Figures 1, 2, and 3 highlight the differences in compensation practices between High 
R&D Intensive firms and Others. Note that regardless of the R&D measure analyzed, 
R&D intensive firms have greater base (e.g., R&D/Sales: $75,561 versus $67,810), 
bonusbase ratios (e.g., R&D/Sales: 21.7% versus 19.3%), and long-term incentive 
eligibility (e.g., R&D/Sales: 78.5% versus 57.3%) than other firms. Recall also that these 
results have already been adjusted for human capital and job characteristics within each 
firm. In other words, even after accounting for similarities in employees and jobs, high 
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R&D intensity firms engage in different compensation practices. As such, our findings are 
consistent with the results based on perceptual data reported by Balkin and Gomez-Mejia 
(1984, 1987). 
The next step is to determine if these R&D effects exist when controlling for other 
potential determinants of compensation differences. The regressions summarized in 
Exhibits 3, 4, and 5 explicitly control for sales, number of employees, income, and 
industry. Organization differences in employee and job characteristics are also controlled 
by virtue of the statistical adjustments discussed in the Method section. R&D intensity has 
a significant positive effect on relative base salary, bonusbase, and long-term incentive 
eligibility using each measure of R&D intensity, with only one exception (Total R&D 
expenditures does not have a significant effect on bonus/base). Thus, in 8 of the 9 models 
(i.e., 3 R&D Intensity measures by 3 forms of pay), R&D has a significant positive effect 
on managerial pay practices. Although the variance explained is low in several cases, 
recall that the effects of other key compensation determinants (human capital and job 
characteristics) were removed prior to these analyses. Nevertheless, it is clear that there is 
much unexplained variability in firms' compensation practices. 
The fact that high R&D intensive firms place more emphasis on contingent pay is 
consistent with predictions based on the leading edge, administrativefiife cycle, and agency 
theory perspectives. In contrast, although the finding of higher base pay is consistent with 
agency theory, it is not consistent with predictions derived from the other two perspectives. 
An important implication of our results is that even firms within the same industry 
may follow very different R&D spending and compensation strategies, because industry 
controls do not eliminate the link between R&D intensity and compensation outcomes. 
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One concern, however, is that measuring industry at the 2-digit level is not sufficiently 
precise to justify the argument that we have really compared firms in the same industry. 
Therefore, we created a subsample that included only 3-digit industries (and only those that 
had a minimum of 3 firms). Exhibit 6 indicates that the more precise control for industry 
did not significantly reduce the R&D intensity coefficient in either the base pay or 
bonuslbase pay equation. Thus, any R&D effect on these pay outcomes does not appear to 
be an industry effect. On the other hand, the R&D intensity coefficient in the long-term 
incentive eligibility equation is substantially reduced when using the 3-digit industry 
controls. Although it is not clear why only the long-term incentive eligibility results would 
change, one possibility is that the simple yes/no nature of the measure is unable to 
accurately capture the full extent of variation within industries. If, for example, the actual 
value of long-term incentives were available, more variation would almost certainly be 
observed, increasing the likelihood of a significant relation with R&D inten~ity.~ 
Finally, to model the effects of R&D strategy on compensation, we used the 
regressions summarized in Exhibits 3-5 to examine the changes in compensation resulting if 
a hypothetical average firm (e.g., R&D/Sales = 3.1%, R&D/Employee = $2,330, and R&D 
= $83 million) became a High R&D intensive firm (R&D/Sales = 5%, R&D/Employee = 
$4,000, and R&D = $130 million). The changes are substantial. For example, an increase 
in R&D/Sales from 3.1% to 5.0% increases the predicted salary from $69,835 to $72,977, 
the predicted bonus from 20% to 21.1% of base (or from $13,967 to $15,398), and the 
predicted long-term incentive eligibility from 60% to 66.7%. 
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DISCUSSION 
Our study provides new evidence that R&D intensive firms differ from other firms 
in the pattern of their compensation practices. For instance, those in the high R&D 
Intensity group (based on R&D/Sales) set their managers' base pay higher, offered greater 
bonuses (as a percentage of base), and made greater use of long-term incentives. 
In terms of the theories reviewed earlier, these findings appear most consistent with 
agency theory, which predicts both higher base pay and greater emphasis on performance 
contingent pay. As discussed, higher levels of base pay may be necessary to attract top 
technical talent. Then, pay based on objective organization performance measures may be 
used because accurate assessments using other (more intermediate) measures of performance 
may be all the more difficult where highly technical products with long-term development 
horizons are concerned. 
The findings provide less support for the leading edge and adrninistrativePife cycle 
predictions. Although the latter, for example, predicts a high emphasis on performance 
contingent pay, it is not consistent with our finding of higher base pay in R&D intensive 
firms. It is possible, however, that the nature of our sample partly explains this lack of 
support. Because most of the firms included were large and established, cash flow is 
likely to be less of a concern than in the small, start-up firms of the type that composed 
the bulk of the sample used by Balkin and Gomez-Mejia (1984, 1987). These smaller or 
younger firms may indeed be less able to offer high base salaries because of the associated 
high fixed costs and demands on cash flow. 
At a more general level, our finding that the relation between R&D and 
compensation is typically significant, even within industries, is consistent with the notion 
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advanced by Gerhart and Milkovich (1989) that these compensation decisions exhibit 
strategic-like properties that may be more aligned with organization characteristics (e.g., 
R&D strategy) rather than industry patterns. Further, even similar firms may simply differ 
in their philosophies about how to design compensation practices to maximize organization 
effectiveness. Some strategies may work better than others. For example, Gerhart and 
Milkovich found that greater use of performance contingent pay was associated with better 
firm financial performance. 
In this vein, future research on the possible firm performance consequences of R&D 
and compensation strategies would be useful. For example, do R&D intensive firms that 
adopt a high base, high contingent pay profile outperform those that do not? Also, is such 
a compensation strategy more effective in High (versus low R&D Intensive firms)? Based 
on self-reports of firm performance by compensation managers, the answer to these 
questions may be "yes" (Balkin & Gomez-Mejia, 1987). However, evidence using 
objective accounting and financial measures is still lacking. In conducting such analyses, 
the choice of performance measure may be crucial (Abowd, 1990). Similarly, the time 
frame for performance may be very important. For example, if long-term growth in sales 
or shareholder wealth is the focus (e.g., in start-up firms), long-term incentive plans may 
be the most important key to success. In other words, future researchers of compensation 
design and strategy will need to continue to keep in mind that different firms have 
different objectives and face different competitive conditions, resulting perhaps in 
differences in the most effective compensation designs. 
A recent study emphasizes the growing importance of these issues (Franko, 1989). 
In it, R&D intensity (as in the present study, defined in terms of R&D/sales) was one of 
19 
the strongest correlates of subsequent sales growth performance of U.S. firms relative to 
international competition over 5-10 year periods. This finding reinforces the need for 
future research on how to insure that compensation strategies strengthen the impact of 
R&D intensity on competitiveness. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1.We thank Tom Friedrich and Michael Sturman for their expert research assistance. 
2.Gerhart and Milkovich (1989) found a correlation of approximately .SO between an 
empirically derived measure of relative pay level (using actual base and bonus payments 
for a sample of employees in each firm) and the reported pay level (measured using a 
method similar to that used by Balkin & Gomez-Mejia, 1984). Although a correlation of 
this size is high enough to suggest convergence, it is sufficiently different from 1 to also 
indicate a significant potential for different results in using the two measures. 
3.0ur definitions of R&D intensity have also been used in some previous literature (e.g., 
the Balkin & Gomez-Mejia research) as indicators of whether a firm is high tech. 
4.Agency theory breaks down when its basic premise does not hold. Asymmetry of 
information is based on separation of owners and managers. In small, new ventures or 
founder-controlled firms, the owners are more likely to possess the critical information; 
Therefore, monitoring costs of other managers may be less. Hence, in startup or smaller 
R&D firms, the need to lead competitors' compensation may be less, since the owners 
themselves are likely to constitute key talent. Outcome based pay increases (bonus and 
long-term incentive) would, however, still be used to encourage managers to innovate. 
5.In addition, judging by the p-values in Exhibit 6, a larger sample size (versus the reduced 
sample used for these analyses) would perhaps have yielded a reduced, but significant 
relation even using the yeslno measure of incentive eligibility. 
Exhibit 1 
Rankings and Data Points for Those Firms Classified as ~ighly R&D ~ntensive 
R and D Intensity R and D/Salesa R and D/Employeea R and D (in 
Measure High Intensity High Intensity millions)" 
A V ~  R & D/Sales ~ v g  R &  e employee High Intensity 
> .05 > $4000 Avg R & D 
> $130 million 
Merck & Co. 
Lilly (Eli) & Co. 
Digital Equipment 
Data General Corp. 
Searle (G.D. ) & Co. 
Prime Computer 















Corning Glass Works 
Thomas & Betts Corp. 
Warner-Lambert Co. 
Rohm & Haas Co. 
Beckton Dickinson & 
Co . 
Honda Motor Ltd-Adr. 
Nalco Chemical Co. 










Allied Signal Inc. 
Texaco Inc. 
"Expressed in 1980 dollars. The C.P.I. adjustment multiplier to convert to 
1988 dollars is 1.44. 
Exhibit 2 
Sample Summary Statistics, Firm Level 
VARIABLES Mean S.D. 
Company Data 
Number of Employees 32,218 36,968 
Sales (millions) $ 3,495 $ 8,465 
Income (millions) $ 159 $ 427 
R and D Intensity Data 
R and D/Sales 
R and D/Employee 
R and D (millions) 
Compensation Data 
Base Salary 
Bonus as a percent of Base 
Long-Term Incentive 
Eligibility 
Number of Firms 
E x h i b i t  3 
E f f e c t  o f  R&D I n t e n s i t y  o n  R e l a t i v e  B a s e  S a l a r y  
C o m p e n s a t i o n  M e a s u r e  R e l a t i v e  R e l a t i v e  R e l a t i v e  
B a s e  S a l a r y a  B a s e  S a l a r y a  B a s e  S a l a r y a  
Company V a r i a b l e s  
Employees  
Income 
S a l e s  
I n d u s t r y  C o n t r o l  V a r i a b l e s  
R  a n d  D I n t e n s i t y  
R  a n d  D / S a l e s  
Yes Yes Yes 
R  a n d  D/Employee 
R  a n d  D 
I n t e r c e p t  
A d j u s t e d  R' 
Number o f  O b s e r v a t i o n s  
Number o f  F i r m s  
" R e l a t i v e  B a s e  S a l a r y  i s  a n  o r g a n i z a t i o n  a v e r a g e ,  a d j u s t e d  f o r  
e m p l o y e e  a n d  job c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  (see d e s c r i p t i o n  i n  t e x t ) .  
b ~ e g r e s s i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t  w i t h  s t a n d a r d  e r r o r  i n  p a r e n t h e s e s  
* p  < . 0 5 ,  o n e - t a i l e d  t e s t  + p  < . 0 5 ,  t w o - t a i l e d  t e s t  
** p  < . 0 1 ,  o n e - t a i l e d  t e s t  ++ p  < . 0 1 ,  t w o - t a i l e d  t e s t  
*** p  < . 0 0 1 ,  o n e - t a i l e d  t e s t  +++ p  < . 0 0 1 ,  t w o - t a i l e d  t e s t  
Exhibit 4 
Effect of R&D Intensity on Relative Bonus as a Percent of Base 
Compensation Measure Relative Relative Relative 
Bonus as a Percent Bonus as a Percent Bonus as a Percent 





Industry Control Variables Yes Yes Yes 
R and D Intensity 
R and D/Sales 
R and D/Employee - 
R and D - 
Intercept 
Adjusted R* .032 
Number of Observations 448 
Number of Firms 110 
'Relative Base Salary is an organization average, adjusted for 
employee and job characteristics (see description in text). 
??egression coefficient with standard error in parentheses 
* p < -05, one-tailed test + p < .05, two-tailed test 
* *  p < .01, one-tailed test ++ p < .01, two-tailed test 
***  p < .001, one-tailed test +++ p < .001, two-tailed test 
Exhibit 5 
E f f e c t  o f  R&D I n t e n s i t y  on R e l a t i v e  Long-Term I n c e n t i v e  E l i g i b i l i t y  
Compensation Measure R e l a t i v e  R e l a t i v e  R e l a t i v e  
Long-Term I n c e n t i v e  Long-Term I n c e n t i v e  Long-Term I n c e n t i v e  
E l i g i b i l i t y a  E l i g i b i l i t y a  E l i g i b i l i t y "  
Company V a r i a b l e s  
Employees 
Income 
S a l e s  
I n d u s t r y  Cont ro l  V a r i a b l e s  Yes Y e s  Yes 
R and D I n t e n s i t y  
R and D/Sales 
R  and D/Employee 
R and D 
I n t e r c e p t  
Adjus ted  R' . I 5 1  -083 -107 
Number of  Observa t ions  448 448 448 
Number o f  Firms 110 110 110 
'Re la t ive  Base S a l a r y  i s  an o r g a n i z a t i o n  average ,  a d j u s t e d  f o r  
employee and job c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  ( s e e  d e s c r i p t i o n  i n  t e x t ) .  
"Regress ion c o e f f i c i e n t  w i t h  s t a n d a r d  e r r o r  i n  p a r e n t h e s e s  
* p  < .05,  o n e - t a i l e d  t e s t  + p  < .05,  t w o - t a i l e d  t e s t  
* *  p  < .01,  o n e - t a i l e d  test  ++ p  < -01 ,  t w o - t a i l e d  tes t  
* * *  p  < .001, o n e - t a i l e d  test  +++ p  < .001, t w o - t a i l e d  t e s t  
Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Average Base Salary for High Intensity and Other Firms Contrasted with 
Overall Sample Mean 
Figure 2. Average Bonus as a Percent of Base for High Intensity and Other Firms 
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